Abstract
Introduction and related work
While Electric Power Systems (EPS) become more and more critical for our society, evaluating the dependability and performability measures of such systems is a highly challenging task. Existing EPS are composed by two complex and tightly cooperating infrastructures: the Electric Infrastructure (EI) for the electricity generation and transportation to final users, and the Computer-based Control System (CCS), introduced in addition to existing SCADA systems and devoted to control the dynamics of EI and to trigger the reconfigurations in emergency situations. Significant difficulties to analyze EPS are posed by the very high complexity of these infrastructures and by the tight coupling between them. Moreover, the complex interactions between such infrastructures make harder or just practically impossible both to analyze the overall system and to decompose it to focus on each infrastructure. There is also a lack of well-established theories, models and tools supporting them, since studies on these topics are at an early stage of development. The importance of the addressed critical infrastructure, and the high number of experienced blackouts, have triggered important research in the last years, to study the dynamics of EPS and to analyze their dependability and the cascading failure risk. Several models based on simulation have been proposed [8, 3, 4, 10, 9, 5 , 2] to represent EPS. A brief summary of some of the available cascading failure simulations and of their modeling details can be found in [7] . Most of the these studies focus on reproducing network disruptions, which eventually lead to blackouts, in order to estimate the vulnerabilities of the system or the impact on the EPS reliability of important network parameters, such as overload or load demand, in presence of disruptions. In most of these approaches, the modeling of the existing SCADA systems and of CCS is not considered explicitly or is very simple. Often, only expert-based methods for the systematic control of large power systems in response to disruptions are (implicitly) modeled, since automated methods are effectively nonexistent [2] . Also, most of the existing models do not provide explicit modeling of the main interdependent subsystems and of the interdependencies between the main subsystems, so evaluation of the impact on dependability and performability of cascading or escalating failures is not trivial. Only very recently interactions between EI disturbances and the often imperfect human operator control actions have been considered [2] . Moreover, although some approaches consider the evolution of the sequences of disruptions in time, the operator's response to disruptions is typically considered instantaneous. Our simulator, EPSyS, attempts to extend current methods, by relaxing some limitations to the representativeness of involved phenomena, mainly considering a reaction time for the operator's reconfiguration following a disruption.
EPSyS is being developed in the frame of the ongoing European Union project CRUTIAL [1] , that aims to improve the studies in this field, with explicit focus on interdependencies between EI and the rest of the surround-ing environment, in particular CCS. To extend the research sphere on this highly challenging field, in the same project a modelling framework is also under investigation, addressing both analytical and simulative model solutions [6] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the EPS subsystems, namely the models of EI and CCS and their respective failure assumptions. The measures of interest are introduced in Section 3. An overview of the architecture of the simulator, and the steps composing the simulation procedure are described in Section 4. In Section 5 a testbed example of use of the simulator is shown. Finally, short conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
Overview of EPS: the EI and CCS subsystems
EI is composed by the transmission and distribution grids. Each grid can be considered as an oriented graph, where each node represents a substation, a generation plant, a load or a combination of generation plant and load, while the arcs represent the transmission or distribution lines.
CCS is composed by the protection system, the frequency regulation system, the voltage regulation system and the teleoperation (or telecontrol) system of the transmission and distribution grids. Each system may be structured in hierarchical levels that differ for their criticality, timeliness and for the locality of their decisions. Local control decisions are only based on the local view of the electric state of a specific component and of the topology, while global decisions are based on a global view of the electric state of all components and of the topology. For the sake of brevity, the description of the defined models will be limited to the transmission grid and to the related CCS.
The EI model and failure assumptions
The transmission network is composed by m transmission lines (F ) and n nodes, with n = n G + n L + n S where n G , n L and n S are the number of generators (G), loads (L) and substations (S), respectively. The topology of the network is described by the m × n incidence matrix A = [a li ], where: a li is 1 if line l exits node i, −1 if line l enters node i, and 0 otherwise. Transmission networks operate with three-phase alternating current (AC). The real input power at each node i is P i , which is positive for the generators, negative for the loads and zero for the substations. The maximum power that a generator i can supply is P . The susceptance of each line l is b l . The electric state of the transmission grid can be represented by the values of various electric parameters associated to each component of the grids: the voltage, the frequency, the angle, the active and reactive power flow. Information about the values of all these parameters when the state changes requires the solution of complex numerical problems [2] . As in [8, 5, 2] , the state and the evolution of the transmission grid are described by the distribution of the active power flows which are computed using a linear direct current (DC) load flow approximation of the AC system. The model of the DC power flow is based on the following assumptions:
• The electric transmission grid operates in steady-state conditions: the power supply has reached an equilibrium condition wherein the power flows are nearly constant along time.
• Transmission line resistance is considered negligible.
• We assume all voltage magnitudes are 1.0 per unit, since in AC systems the voltages are phasors specified by a magnitude and an angle (phase), and "per unit" (i.e. normalized) values are used.
• cos(θ i − θ j ) ≈ 1 and sin(θ i − θ j ) ≈ θ i − θ j , where θ h is the voltage phase at node h.
• One of the generators is defined as the reference node (slack node), which has voltage angle zero.
• The total generated power is forced to exactly balance the total load demand, i.e.:
Under these assumptions, the equations for the DC power flow approximation can be derived from the standard AC circuit equations. They can be written as:
where:
• B = A T · D · A is the n × n susceptance matrix, and A T is the transpose of A,
is the m × m diagonal matrix with the l-th diagonal entry representing the susceptance b l ,
• Θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ) T , is the node voltage angle vector,
• P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) T is the real power injection vector,
T is the line power flow vector.
Equations (2) and (3) give a linear relationship between the power flow F on the lines and the input power P at the nodes. The active power flow on the transmission lines are obtained in terms of the voltage phases from equation (3) . The voltage phases are obtained from equation (2) in terms of the input power at the nodes, using the zero angle of the reference node and allowing for the singularity of the matrix B, which has rank n − 1 because of the constraint (1). The real power injected at the reference node is computed from equation (1). A disruption is the unexpected failure or outage of a generator, power line or substation. Components affected by a disruption are out of service (disconnected from the grid). When a substation is out of service, all the lines connected to the substation are out of service.
A random disruption may trigger cascading disruptions in the grid and cascading failures in the CCS. The propagation of a disruption can be stopped by the protections by isolating from the grid the component affected by the disruption. Causes of a random disruption include: lightnings, tree falls, wear and tear, etc. Causes of a cascading disruption include: excessive heating of a component due to overloads, failures in the CCS components (e.g., incorrect line trips due to hidden failures in the protections), etc. The components which are out of service can be put back in service only when the cause of the disruption is removed; anyway, after a disruption of a component, a time (from a few seconds to hours) must pass before the component can be put back in service. The failure model is based on the following assumptions:
1. Cascading disruptions for which the component can be put back in service in just a few seconds are not considered.
2. When a random disruption occurs, the affected component is considered damaged. In this case, the repair is required to put back in service the component. Repair is not yet implemented, so a damaged component permanently remains out of service.
3. Random disruptions are statistically independent in space and time.
4. The time of occurrence of disruptions of a generator, power line or substation (which are in service) can be deterministic or random with general distribution selected among the most common and realistic ones (such as exponential).
5. The rate of occurrence λ l of a random disruption of a line l is proportional to the length of the line.
6. The (random or cascading) disruption of a component propagates to a neighbor component j (causing a cascading disruption) with probability p HF (P j ) dependent on the power flow P j through j and on the subsequent exposures to disruptions. The probability p HF (P j ) represents the failure of the protection, as it will be shown in Section 2.1. In this case the component j is considered damaged.
7. When the excessive heating of a line l due to overloads causes a (cascading) disruption of l, the line l is damaged (due to a failure of the protection) with probability p HF (F l ), as it will be shown below. Alternatively, with probability 1 − p HF (F l ) the line is only disconnected by the protection.
8. For modeling the heating of a line, the spatial variation in the temperature along the line and the loss of heat of each element of the surface of the rod by radiation to the surrounding medium are not taken into account.
9. Transient instability, i.e., the disconnection of one or more generators because of loss of synchronism, has not been (explicitly) considered.
10. A big variation of power flow through a generator in a small interval of time (e.g. due to a variation of the load) causes a (cascading) disruption. In this case, the generator i is damaged (due to a failure of the protection) with probability p HF (P i ), otherwise it is only disconnected by the protection.
From assumption ( 5), the parameters of the distributions of the occurrence time of a random disruption of a line l are defined in such a way that λ l = λl l where λ is the constant failure rate per unit length and l l is the length of the line. Overloads are caused by reactions to disruptions and reconfigurations triggered by CCS. For modeling the heating of a line l due to overloads, the same approach proposed in [2] is considered, based on the assumption ( 8) . The line temperature T l (t) at time t is given by the simple approximated equation:
where T (0) is the initial temperature of the line and
is the equilibrium temperature of l for t → ∞, where T m is the temperature of the medium. The parameters η and ν are defined as η = 0.239/(ρcω 2 σ) and ν = Hp/(ρcω), supposing that the transmission line has constant area of cross-section ω, perimeter p, electrical conductivity σ, density ρ, specific heat c and surface conductance H = 8 × 10 −5 (u/d) 1/2 for a turbulent flow of air with velocity u perpendicular to a circular cylinder of diameter d. When F l = F max l the temperature T l (t) converges to the critical temperature T dl , for which the line l sags and trips. A (cascading) disruption of l due to the power flow F l , with
, occurs when the temperature reaches T dl at some time t dl (measured from the moment when the power flow through l has changed). The time to disruption t dl of line l is derived from equation (4) and is given by:
More details are in [2] . The generators cannot fail due to an overload, because the produced power cannot exceed a given threshold. From the assumption ( 10), a generator can fail due to a power flow variation greater than a given threshold ∆P max i in a given ∆t max i time interval. Thus, a (cascading) disruption of a generator i occurs when:
, where P i (t 2 ) is the power flow injected on i at time t 2 and P i (t 1 ) is the previous one injected on i at time t 1 , with t 1 ≤ t 2 .
The CCS model and failure assumptions
For simplifying the CCS model, the effect on the transmission grid of generation redispatch, load shedding or grid reconfiguration is only considered, and the details of the different components of CCS are not taken into account. The behavior of CCS is structured in two levels: local (or fast) and global (slower) decision. Each level is characterized by an activation condition, a reaction delay and a reconfiguration strategy (RS). The activation condition (defined as a simple predicate) specifies the grid events that enable the reaction of a specific level of CCS. Different events or sequences of events can enable different reaction levels. The reaction delay models the overall computation and application time needed by CCS to apply a reconfiguration. The reconfiguration strategy RS defines how the configuration of EI changes when CCS reacts to a disruption. For each level, a different reconfiguration function is modeled:
• RS 1 (), to represent the effect on transmission grid of the local and fast reactions to a disruption.
• RS 2 (), to represent the effect on transmission grid of the global and slower reaction to a disruption.
Both these functions are applied to the state of EI at the time immediately before the occurrence of the disruption and generate the new values for P and F, which are the result of the reaction of CCS to the disruption. The following simplifying assumptions are considered:
11. The output values of RS 1 () and RS 2 () for P and F satisfy the power flow equations (1), (2) and (3).
12. The reaction to a disruption represented by RS 1 () is "worse" (from the point of view of the tradeoff between voltage quality and costs) than the reaction represented by RS 2 (), since RS 1 () is based on a local view of the state of the system and requires only a few seconds to react.
13. The times to trigger RS 1 () and RS 2 () are t
The definition of the functions RS 1 () and RS 2 () depends on the policies and algorithms adopted by CCS. For a given power demand, the power flow equations (1), (2) and (3) do not have a unique solution. As in [8, 2] , a possible definition of the function RS 2 () is given by the solution (values for P and F) of equations (1), (2) and (3) while minimizing the simple cost function:
with the following constraints:
where P 0 i is the injected power immediately before the occurrence of the disruption that triggers RS 2 (). The parameter W L is the cost for load shedding, which is set to an high value in order to force the generation dispatch first. k is the line overload parameter; if k < 1 the lines are not overloaded, while if k ≥ 1 the lines may be overloaded in consequence of the intervention of the CCS [2] . In C 2 , the cost to adjust the generators is the same and the loads have the same priority to be served. The function C 2 aims at performing the least possible modifications of the electric state of the grid, with respect to the electric state immediately before the occurrence of the disruption that triggered RS 2 ().
Different cost functions can be considered for RS 2 ().
A possible definition of the function RS 1 () is given by the following steps:
1. For a given load power demand and distribution of generation P, the solution F of equations (1), (2) and (3) is obtained, if it exists. In this case redispatch or load shedding are not needed, but the power flow through the lines increases and it can produce overload, especially if constraint (8) is not considered or if k > 1.
2. Otherwise (if redispatch or load shedding are required) the values for P and F are obtained solving the following optimization problem with C 1 = C 2 :
such that the power flow equations (1), (2) and (3) and the constraints (6), (7) and (8) are satisfied and
where C min 2
is the minimum value of C 2 obtained solving (the optimization problem of) RS 2 (), and β, with β ≥ 1, represents how much RS 1 () is worse than RS 2 (), according to assumption ( 12).
Following the approach proposed in [5] for the hidden failure model of the protections, the probability p HF (P ) that a protection fails is low when the power flow is below the component limit P CL , and increases linearly to 1 when the component flow is 1.4 times the value of P CL :
Moreover, the hidden failure probability P HF reduces to zero after the first exposure to disruption [5] . The failures of the CCS components that are considered in the current implementation are omission and timing failures.
Measures of interest
The simulator supports the evaluation of dependability and performability measures of EPS, well representative of the behavior of the whole modeled infrastructure, as well as evolution of the electrical parameters along time. The main measures considered in the current implementation are:
• The expected reward E[V t ] at time t, defined by:
where I t is a random variable that is equal to 1 if the real injected power in the transmission grid at time t is P, otherwise I t = 0, and R(P) is the reward associated to the real injected power P, where:
with W G i and W L j the cost and the reward associated to generator i or load j, respectively.
• 
where J [0,t] is a random variable that represents the total time that the real injected power has value P during the time interval [0, t].
• The expected percentage of delivered power (the delivered power divided by the power demand) B t and B [0,t] at time t and in the interval [0, t], respectively. This is a particular case of the previous ones.
• The expected numbers of components M t and M [0,t] affected by a disruption at time t and in the interval [0, t], respectively.
The architecture of the simulator and the simulation procedure
EPSyS has been structured in six main modules, as shown in Figure 1 . Two of them (ECM and TM) reproduce the EI behavior. The module ECM implements the (electrical) state of the elements of the transmission grid and their failure model. ECM also includes the protection system (PM) embedded into EI, which triggers the automatic defensive actions after a disruption and the hidden failure model. The module TM implements the topology of the transmission grid represented by an oriented graph. The modules CCSM1 and CCSM2 implement the behavior of CCS by supporting the functions RS 1 () and RS 2 (), respectively. If the activation conditions are met, the corresponding corrective actions are performed immediately by CCSM1 and within a reaction delay by CCSM2. The component EQ implements the events queue, which allows the whole power system model to evolve reproducing the dynamics of EPS.
Finally, there is the module MOIM that supports the measures of interest.
Before detailing the simulation procedure, let's represent the states of EI by the t-uple (E i,h , T i ), with i = 1, 2, · · · , and h = 1, 2. T i is the topology and E i,h represents the electrical state resulting from the application of the reconfiguration strategy RS h () on the topology T i . The main steps of a simulation run are:
1. For a given topology represented by matrix A and a given susceptance matrix B, the initial setting for P and F can be derived manually or solving an optimization problem using the same approach adopted to evaluate the functions RS. The initial state of EI is represented by (E 0,2 , T 0 ).
2.
Values of the occurrence times of random disruptions (of EI and failures of CCS) are sampled from the distributions considered for the failure model.
3. When, in the state (E i,2 , T i ), a random (or cascading) disruption is selected from the event queue, the following steps are performed with j = i + 1.
4.
The disruption propagates to the neighbor components, based on the hidden failure model of the protections, generating a new topology T j for EI.
5. The function RS 2 () is evaluated, based on the electrical state E i,2 and on the topology T j .
6. The function RS 1 () is evaluated, based on the electrical state E i,2 and on the topology T j . If the definition of RS 1 () is based on the result of the optimization problem defined for RS 2 (), under constraint (10), the function RS 2 () must be evaluated before RS 1 ().
7. The outputs P and F of RS 1 () are immediately applied to EI (i.e., at the system time of the disruption occurrence), generating a new E j,1 for EI.
8. The values of the occurrence times of cascading disruptions for the new state (E j,1 , T j ) are sampled from the overloading failure model.
The value of the delay t RS 2
to the occurrence of the reconfiguration P and F, obtained through the solution of RS 2 (), is sampled from the distributions considered for the CCS model. 10 . When cascading or random disruptions occur (being selected from the event queue) before time t RS 2 , the simulation goes to step 4. with j = j + 1 (where the evaluation of RS 2 () is restarted based on the new topology generated by the new disruption).
11. Otherwise, if no disruption occurred before t RS 2 , at time t RS 2 the outputs P and F of RS 2 () are applied, generating a new state (E j,2 , T j ) for EI.
12. The values of the occurrence times of cascading disruptions for the new state (E j,2 , T j ) are sampled from the overloading failure model.
13
. If an halting condition is satisfied (e.g, a total blackout, or a state without cascading and random disruptions, or when a pre-determined instant of time is reached), the simulation stops, otherwise the simulation goes to step 3.
Note that the functions RS 1 () and RS 2 () are evaluated on the states (E i,2 , T j ), although alternative choices could be considered. Moreover, when cascading or random disruptions occur before time t RS 2 (step 10.), instead of restarting the evaluation of RS 2 (), different alternatives can be considered, such as performing immediate but less effective actions, or even do nothing.
A testbed example
We consider a simple testbed grid with 6 loads, 6 generators and 14 transmission lines, as shown in Figure 2 . The labels associated to the generators N i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 6, the loads N j , 7 ≤ j ≤ 12, and to the lines L l , 1 ≤ l ≤ 14, represent respectively (P i , P max i ), (P j ), and (F l , F max l ), where P i is the initial power generated by N i , −P j is the power demand of N j and F l is the initial power flow through the line L l . The power demand is constant in time, and the simulation time frame is t = 1440 minutes (24 hours). The purpose of this testbed is to evaluate the impact on the measures of interest of the outage of one of the most critical transmission lines, L 1 . For the sake of brevity, we limit our analysis to the percentage of delivered power (the delivered power divided by the power demand) B [0,t] .
On this set of simulations, we adopt some further simplifications setting boundary values for the following model parameters: the probability of propagation of events due to hidden failures is set as p HF (P j ) = 0; the generators are ideal (∆P max i = P i , ∆t max i = 0); random disturbances are not considered (λ = 0); the susceptance of each line l is b l = 1. We characterize different power demand, generated power and power flow through the lines with the parameter α, the grid stress factor. In particular, for α < 1 the system is understressed, while for α > 1 the system is overstressed. 
= 1440
′ . Other values of the parameters for this scenario are summarized in Table 1 . 
′ , the strategy RS 2 () is never applied. Hence t RS 2
′ represents the worst possible behavior of the CCS system, as in the case of a time failure.
Figures 3 and 4 have been determined by simulating the following sequence of events:
1. The outage of L 1 (at time t 1 = 1 ′ :40 ′′ ) triggers the reaction of RS 1 () causing the immediate redistribution of power flow from L 1 to L 9 in order to fullfill the load request. Depending on the actual value of α, an overload can occurs on the line L 9 .
2. The overload on L 9 can cause its disruption (at time t 2 ) after a time t D (α), depending on α.
3. The outage of L 1 also triggers the reaction of RS 2 () (at time t 3 ) after a time t for different values of α.
If t RS 2
< t D (α) the reaction of RS 2 () equilibrates the system by removing the overload from L 9 , being k = 1 in equation (8) . Otherwise, a disruption occurs in L 9 .
From these events, it derives the importance of the factor t D (α) and of the line L 9 . This line is critical because after the outage of L 1 it becomes the only way for the generators N 1 and N 6 to deliver power to the rest of the grid. When the strategy RS 2 () is applied, for t RS 2 < t D (α), it removes all the overloads. In this case, the total power generated by N 1 and N 6 is limited by the maximum power flow that can flow through the line L 9 , that is kF max l = F max l = 620 MW. That limit becomes more and more a bottleneck as power demand, driven by α, increases. When a disruption occurs in L 9 , if t RS 2 ≥ t D (α), the generators N 1 and N 6 are disconnected from the grid and a loss of load occurs, which increases as α increases. Being N 1 and N 6 the most powerful generators, their loss leads to a big loss of load, causing the discontinuities on the values of B [0,t] shown in Figure 3 . It must be noted that these discontinuities occur at time t D (α), which decreases as α increases causing an higher overload on L 9 , as it may be easily derived from equation (5) . To go in more details, let's focus on the curve for α = 1.5 for which t D (1. Because of the outage of L 9 , CCS restarts the evaluation of RS 2 (), and that further delays the reaction to RS 2 (). Anyway, this delay is negligible on a 24 hour timeframe. Figure 4 shows the evolution in time of the loading On the X-axis there is the number of the transmission line, so we have one vertical bar for each line; on the Y-axis, we have time since the start of the simulation. The color of each bar represents the loading of the corresponding line in a given state: the value is normalized with respect to the measured maximum load, so black means zero power flow, while white represents the maximum power flow. The load becomes heavier as the color becomes near to white, and a value greater than 1 for power flow means an overload.
We now describe the behavior of the most important lines on this testbed, in consequence of the events sequence. Let's consider L 1 first. This line has acceptable load until its disruption at time t 1 ; L 1 then goes out of service, so it has zero load (black bar) until the end of the simulation. RS 1 (), being set with k = ∞, reacts by reconfiguring the EI in a way that leaves L 9 highly overloaded; RS 2 () also starts. While L 9 had too an acceptable load until t 1 too, it now experiences a heavy overload: L 9 carries the biggest load in the interval from t 1 to t 2 = 3 ′ :54 ′′ . At t 2 , L 9 is disconnected by its protections, so RS 2 (), still running in reaction to the first disruption, is restarted. RS 1 () runs again, but it cannot avoid a load loss; actually, being β = 2, a total blackout is experienced. RS 2 () completes at t 3 = 6 ′ :54 ′′ = t 2 + t RS 2 , and delivers a stable state with no overloaded lines, with only loads N 8 and N 12 out of service and with a decresed total power delivered with respect to the starting state.
Conclusions
This paper has presented the simulation models and the implementation of EPSyS, an ad-hoc simulator developed to analyze EPS, considering the interdependencies existing between the two EPS subsystems: EI and CCS. The models adopted for the stochastic analysis of EPS, including the failure models of the transmission grid and of the CCS, have been described in detail, as well as their implementation. An example of use of the simulator has been shown on a simple testbed.
An experiments campaign is currently in progress, where EPSyS is used to analyze the behavior of a portion of the IEEE 118 Bus test Network (http://www.ee. washington.edu/research/pstca) under several EI disruption conditions. The results of this testbed scenario will be made available soon.
